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Oh Say, Does That Star
Spangled Banner Yet ... Burn?
Scott Liggett

On August 22, during the 1984 Republican National
Convention in Dallas, an unexpected event changed the way
Americans would look at their flag forever. What started off
as a political demonstration to protest the policies of the
Reagan Administration and those of certain Dallas-based
businesses culminated in a fiery display. This caused a serious
inquiry into what would prove to test the limits of freedom of
speech under America's First Amendment rights (109 S.Ct.
2533, 2535). Protestors who participated in the
demonstration, called the "Republican War Chest Tour,"
marched through the streets of Dallas, Texas, mocking
political policies regarding nuclear war. They also staged "dieins," aimed at illustrating the realities of nuclear war, at local
business (Donabedian 229). After a spirited march, the
protestors finally reached their destination, Dallas City Hall.
In full view of the crowd, one of the demonstration's leaders,
Gregory Lee Johnson, was handed a stolen American flag,
which he doused with kerosine and ignited as spectators
chanted anti-American slogans (Mullins 103). No violence
resulted from Johnson's action, but many onlookers reported
to have been seriously offended; a spectator gathered up the
remains of the flag and buried them in his back yard.
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Approximately 30-45 minutes later, the Dallas police arrived
and took Johnson and several other protestors into custody
(755 S.W.2d 92). With the arrest of Johnson the battle was on.
The State of Texas charged that Johnson was in violation of
Texas Penal Code 42.09 which prohibits the desecration of a
venerated object. Conversely, Johnson claimed he was under
the protection of the First Amendment.
In the trial that followed, Johnson was found guilty of
violating Texas Penal Code 42.09 in County Criminal Court
No.8, Dallas County, Texas. He was sentenced to one year's
imprisonment in the county jail and was fined $2,000.00
(Mullins 105). The Dallas County Criminal Court felt they
had sufficient grounds to convict Johnson based on Texas
Penal Code 42.09 which states:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or
knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial; or
(3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, "desecrate" means
deface, damage, or otherwise physical mistreat in a
way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or
more persons likely to observe or discover his action.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A
misdemeanor. (Welborn 265)
Clearly, Johnson was in violation of several points of this
penal code. Not only did he intentionally desecrate the
national flag, prohibited by section 42.09(a)(3), but he also
satisfied the definition of "desecrate" in section 42.09(b). With
regard to Johnson's claim of free speech protection, Texas
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insisted that they had an interest in maintaining the flag as a
symbol of national unity which justified their upholding the
statute. Additionally, the State held that there was no conflict
between its penal code and their statute that encourages
burning of the flag when it becomes worn or dirty
(Donabedian 230).
Johnson appealed the decision to the Dallas Court of
Appeals, Fifth Supreme Judicial District, on the grounds that
the Texas penal code "impermissibly interfered with his
freedom of speech under the first amendment" (Donabedian
230). Along with this assertion, Johnson claimed that the
court was in error on a total of fourteen points (or grounds of
error). Points One through Eight related to how Texas Penal
Code Section 42.09 "violates the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, Article I, Sec. 8 of the Texas
Constitution, and Article 1.16 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure as an unconstitutional restraint on Johnson's right
of free speech" (706 S.W.2d 120, 122). Johnson's ninth point
claimed that the "trial court erred in instructing the jury on
the law of parties" (706 S.W.2d 120, 122). Points Ten and
Eleven contended that the trial court did not allow limiting
instruction on a videotape that was admitted as evidence
which showed nonessential conduct of other persons related
to the demonstration (706 S.W.2d 120, 122). Point Twelve
simply objected to the admission of certain evidence during
the punishment stage of the trial, namely, "evidence of
Johnson's prior convictions which were never disclosed to
Johnson in violation of the trial court's disclosure order" (706
S.W.2d 120, 122). Both Points Thirteen and Fourteen have to
do with Johnson's claim that the court erred in overruling his

2

Approximately 30-45 minutes later, the Dallas police arrived
and took Johnson and several other protestors into custody
(755 S.W.2d 92). With the arrest of Johnson the battle was on.
The State of Texas charged that Johnson was in violation of
Texas Penal Code 42.09 which prohibits the desecration of a
venerated object. Conversely, Johnson claimed he was under
the protection of the First Amendment.
In the trial that followed, Johnson was found guilty of
violating Texas Penal Code 42.09 in County Criminal Court
No.8, Dallas County, Texas. He was sentenced to one year's
imprisonment in the county jail and was fined $2,000.00
(Mullins 105). The Dallas County Criminal Court felt they
had sufficient grounds to convict Johnson based on Texas
Penal Code 42.09 which states:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or
knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial; or
(3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, "desecrate" means
deface, damage, or otherwise physical mistreat in a
way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or
more persons likely to observe or discover his action.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A
misdemeanor. (Welborn 265)
Clearly, Johnson was in violation of several points of this
penal code. Not only did he intentionally desecrate the
national flag, prohibited by section 42.09(a)(3), but he also
satisfied the definition of "desecrate" in section 42.09(b). With
regard to Johnson's claim of free speech protection, Texas

3

insisted that they had an interest in maintaining the flag as a
symbol of national unity which justified their upholding the
statute. Additionally, the State held that there was no conflict
between its penal code and their statute that encourages
burning of the flag when it becomes worn or dirty
(Donabedian 230).
Johnson appealed the decision to the Dallas Court of
Appeals, Fifth Supreme Judicial District, on the grounds that
the Texas penal code "impermissibly interfered with his
freedom of speech under the first amendment" (Donabedian
230). Along with this assertion, Johnson claimed that the
court was in error on a total of fourteen points (or grounds of
error). Points One through Eight related to how Texas Penal
Code Section 42.09 "violates the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, Article I, Sec. 8 of the Texas
Constitution, and Article 1.16 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure as an unconstitutional restraint on Johnson's right
of free speech" (706 S.W.2d 120, 122). Johnson's ninth point
claimed that the "trial court erred in instructing the jury on
the law of parties" (706 S.W.2d 120, 122). Points Ten and
Eleven contended that the trial court did not allow limiting
instruction on a videotape that was admitted as evidence
which showed nonessential conduct of other persons related
to the demonstration (706 S.W.2d 120, 122). Point Twelve
simply objected to the admission of certain evidence during
the punishment stage of the trial, namely, "evidence of
Johnson's prior convictions which were never disclosed to
Johnson in violation of the trial court's disclosure order" (706
S.W.2d 120, 122). Both Points Thirteen and Fourteen have to
do with Johnson's claim that the court erred in overruling his

4

objections to both the prosecutor's jury argument during
punishment and the prosecutor's closing argument,
respectively {706 S.W.2d 120, 122). Despite Johnson's
carefully thought-out objections, the Texas Court of Appeals
denied a retrial of his case on February 26, 1986, and affirmed
the lower court's decision by claiming that there was no
evidence of error (706 S.W.2d 120, 122). The Texas Court of
Appeals then defended its decision by systematically
countering Johnson's objections (706 S.W.2d 120, 122).
Regarding Points One through Eight, the court explained
Johnson's claim, "that the application of section 42.09 of the
Texas Penal Code is unconstitutionally vague,
unconstitutionally overbroad, and violative of his first
amendment rights," was invalid {706 S.W.2d 120, 122). First,
Johnson claimed that the statute was vague and was founded
on the assertion that whether or not an act was permissible
depended on the perceptions and interpretations of others
likely to observe the action, and therefore, such a statute
"lacks the first essentials of due process" {706 S.W.2d 120, 122).
Johnson backed his claim with Ely v. State which favored this
position. The court responded in kind by referring to
McCarty v. State, which held that due process only requires
that sufficient warning be given by the law so that people can
avoid violation of it (706 S.W.2d 120, 122). Furthermore,
Floyd v. State found that words that are defined in dictionaries
and understood by people of common intelligence are not
considered vague {706 S.W.2d 120, 122). The court then
pointed out that the terms "deface," "damage," and "physically
mistreat" are commonly understood terms and the act of
burning the American flag clearly comprises "desecration"

5

under the Texas statute (706 S.W.2d 120, 122).
Second, the court ruled that Johnson's contention that
the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad was tenuous.
According to Baker v. State, a statute is overbroad only if it
prohibits both that which is and that which is not protected
by the constitution (706 S.W.2d 120, 122). Therefore, since
the statue does not prohibit both legitimate political protests
and the burning of the American flag, it is not overbroad {706
S.W.2d 120, 122).
Johnson's final contention, with regard to grounds of
error One through Eight, alleged that the statue violated his
rights to free speech according to the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution {706 S.W.2d
120, 122-23). Thanks to Spence v. Johnson, the courts now
have a two-part analysis for judging such cases of flag
desecration: First, the court must determine whether the
action is protected by the First Amendment; and second, it
must decide if the interest of the state in the case is significant
enough to encroach upon the person's constitutional rights
(706 S.W.2d 120, 123). With this mechanism in place, the
court had a backdrop on which to view Johnson's case.
Considering the first condition, the court acknowledged that
nonverbal expression could be considered free speech and thus
ruled that Johnson's burning of the flag was indeed
constitutionally-protected free speech under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. They cited the following as their
basis for the decision:
We must consider "the nature of the appellant's
activity combined with the factual context and
environment in which it was undertaken." Spence v.
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Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10, 94 S.Ct. 2727,

2730, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974). If appellant shows "[a]n
intent to convey a particularized message ... and in
the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was
great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it," Spence, at 410-11, 94 S.Ct. at 2730,
then the activity is protected speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. Monroe v. State Court
ofFulton County, 739 F.2d 568, 571 (11th Cir. 1984).
(706 S.W.2d 120, 123)
The court said that it was abundantly clear that Johnson had
"intended to convey a particularized message ... and that this
message was very likely to be understood by those who
viewed it" (706 S.W.2d 120, 123). Therefore, Johnson's act of
burning the flag was symbolic speech and was indeed entitled
to "First Amendment scrutiny" (706 S.W.2d 120, 123).
The first criterion having been met, the second part of
the analysis requires that the State must show that it has
sufficient interest to infringe upon a person's First
Amendment rights. The State of Texas proffered two such
interests: (1) "preventing breaches of the peace" and (2)
"protection of the flag as a symbol of national unity" (706
S.W.2d 120, 123). As far as the first interest is concerned, there
are basically two camps of thought. One side maintains that
flag desecration by itself is not sufficient incitement to intrude
upon First Amendment rights. They insist that flag
desecration must be accompanied by objective proof of
looming public animosity. Two such decisions which
maintain this view were reached by Monroe v. State Court of
Fulton County and Sutherland v. DeWulf(706 S.W.2d 120, 123).

In contrast, the other side believes that a state may act, despite
encroachment on First Amendment rights, to prevent
breaches of the public peace because flag desecration in and of
itself is "inherently inflammatory" (706 S.W.2d 120, 123).
Two cases from this camp are Deeds v. State and Radich v.
Criminal Court (706 S.W.2d 120, 123). The Texas Court of
Appeals joined with this latter camp's view. Thus, the court
felt that they had sufficient grounds to rule that the Texas
Penal Code was "a legitimate and constitutional means of
protecting the public peace" (706 S.W.2d 120, 123).
Having validated the first interest put forth by the state,
the court now had to appraise the validity of the state's second
point, preserving the flag as a symbol of the nation's unity.
The court chose to disagree with Monroe v. State Court of
Fulton County and instead affirmed that the state does have an
interest in preserving the flag in this way (706 S.W.2d 120,
124). By choosing to do this, the court affirmed the State's
second interest. Confident that they adequately refuted
Joh.n,son's arguments concerning this part of his appeal, the
court ruled that Texas Penal Code 42.09 was constitutional
and overruled Johnson's grounds of error One through Eight
(706 S.W.2d 120, 124).
As for Point Nine of Johnson's grounds of error, he
claimed that the court was wrong in instructing the jury on
the law of parties. Since he acted alone in the burning of the
flag, Johnson held that the instruction of the jury, with regard
to the law of parties, shifted the burden of proof and did
"egregious harm" to the outcome of the trial, because there
was no evidence given to support the prosecution's charges
(706 S.W.2d 120,124). The court gave three reasons why they
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felt Johnson's allegations were unjustified. First, they
observed that the instruction was submitted without any
objection from Johnson at the time of the trial (706 S.W.2d
120, 124). Second, to require a reversal "the harm must be so
egregious as to have denied Johnson 'a fair and impartial trial"'
(706 S.W.2d 120, 124). After looking at the degree of harm to
the case as a whole, the court asserted that in light of the fact
that the jury had included a paragraph "conditioning
Johnson's guilt on a finding that he acted alone or as a party"
showed that it was improbable that they were "misled by the
instruction" (706 S.W.2d 120, 124). Third, the evidence
showed more than Johnson's guilt as a party; it also showed
him guilty as an individual. This invalidated his claim that the
burden of proof was shifted. Hence, the court overruled
Johnson's ninth point and held that "no egregious harm
occurred" (706 S.W.2d 120,124).
Johnson's grounds of error Ten and Eleven claimed the
court was in error in admitting a videotape that displayed
"extraneous conduct of other persons" and that the court
refused to give the jury "limiting instruction on it" (706
S.W.2d 120, 124). The court countered these two points by
first justifying the state's interest in submitting the tape, and
then by giving their opinion that the tape was relevant to the
case. With regard to the state's justification for admitting the
tape, the court cited jackson v. State which found that the State
is allowed to admit circumstantial evidence in order to
establish the context of a case for the jury. In addition to this,
the Court of Appeals felt it was presented properly since no
sound was played along with the tape, thus eliminating news
commentary which might have influenced the jury (706
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s.W.2d 120, 124). In the final part of the court's explanation,
Points Ten and Eleven, they found the tape relevant to the
case and in no need of limiting instruction "because the acts of
other persons depicted in the videotape were part of the res
gestae of Johnson's offense" (706 S.W.2d 120, 124).
Johnson's twelfth ground of error professed that the
court erred during the punishment stage of the trial. Despite
Johnson's objection, the court admitted into evidence a record
of Johnson's prior convictions which were not disclosed to
him. This was "in violation of the trial court's disclosure
order" (706 S.W.2d 120, 124). The court attested that Johnson
had waived his rights to contention of this point by his
"failure to seek a postponement or a continuance in response
to the unexpectedly offered convictions" (706 S.W.2d 120,
124). Accordingly, Johnson's twelfth point of contention was
also overruled.
Johnson alleged, in Point Thirteen, that the prosecutor's
final jury argument was not supported by the evidence of the
case and called for jury speculation (706 S.W.2d 120, 125).
Part of the prosecutor's final argument, describing Johnson,
was as follows:
And you know that he's also creating a lot of danger
for a lot of people by what he does and the way he
thinks. What did Mr. Walker tell you from the
evidence he would have done had he been there? He
would have tried to stop it. What would this man
with a gun on his chest [referring to his tee-shirt's
logo] and his running buddies have done to Mr.
Walker if he had tried to stop it. (706 S.W.2d 120,
125)
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When Johnson objected to the prosecution's final argument,
the trial court overruled his objection. The Texas Court of
Appeals explained that the conclusion required by the jury
was to speculate on the likelihood of a breach of the peace and
not on whether Johnson would have committed violent acts.
Because this was the intent, the appellate court found that the
argument was not so "manifestly improper" as to authorize a
reversal (706 S.W.2d 123,125). The court sided with Brooks v.
State which resolves that in order for a reversal to be
necessary, "allegedly improper argument must be extreme or
manifestly improper or inject new and harmful facts into the
record" (706 S.W.2d 123, 125). The Court of Appeals felt that
the prosecutor's argument did not meet these qualifications
and thus overruled Johnson's thirteenth ground of error (706
S.W.2d 120, 125).
Point of error Fourteen also protested improper jury
argument. Johnson objected to the prosecution's jury
argument, which incited the jury to base its decision on the
expectations of their community and the effect their decision
would have on it (706 S.W.2d 120, 125). The prosecutor
encouraged the jury as follows:
That when it comes to destroying and enjoying the
destroying the symbol of our country that is
offensive and it's serious as far as every American is
concerned, and when you go back into that jury
room you represent each and every one of them; and
don't forget it .... consider the community effect of
your verdict. (706 S.W.2d 120, 125)
The Court of Appeals found that the prosecutor's
statements were accurate as an explanation of the jury's role as

II

representatives of the whole community. This being the case,
the statements were deemed appropriate supplications for the
enforcement of the law, backed by Whitington v. State (706
S.W.2d 120, 125).
Having systematically defeated all fourteen of Johnson's
grounds for error, the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgement of the trial court (706 S.W.2d 120, 12?)·. Johnson
was not satisfied with the appellate court's convtctwns and
appealed the case for discretionary review to the T e~as Cou~
of Criminal Appeals on April20, 1988. The court ftrst demed
a rehearing on June 8, 1988, but then granted stay and recalled
the mandate on October 11, 1988. Certiorari was granted on
October 17, 1988 (755 S.W.2d 92). The Criminal Court of
Appeals explained their reason for granting discretionary
revtew:
to determine (1) whether V.T.C.A. Penal Code,§
42.09(a)(3) violates Art. I, sec. 8 of the Texas
Constitution or the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution, and (2) whether the prosecutor's
closing argument during the punishment phase of
the trial denied appellant a fair trial. (755 S.W.2d 92,
93)
Upon reviewing Johnson's case, the Texas Criminal
Court of Appeals' findings were contrary enough to reverse
the decision of the Texas Court of Appeals. In reviewing the
case, the court pointed out that the Dallas court had rejected
several points of Johnson's grounds of error, such a~ t~e
admission of the videotape as evidence and the admtsswn of
Johnson's prior convictions at the punishment stage of the
trial. These points, along with the question which the court
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had granted review of (namely the prosecutor's jury
argument), were stated as irrelevant to the Texas Criminal
Court's final disposition of the case (755 S.W.2d 92, 94). The
court chose to focus instead on the first reason that they had
granted review. They felt that their findings with regard to
the first reason were compelling enough that they "need not
reach appellant's contention concerning the prosecutor's jury
argument in the punishment stage of the trial" (755 S.W.2d 92,
97).
When embarking on answering the question of whether
or not the Texas statute on flag burning was in violation of
Art. I, sec. 8 of the Texas Constitution or the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution, the court
made the following important critique of the procedure of the
Court of Appeal's decision:
In the Court of Appeals, appellant assigned eight
separate points of error on the issue of free speech.
Of these eight points, half were based exclusively on
Texas law. The Court of Appeals grouped these
eight points together and purportedly decided them
on both state and federal grounds. Their analysis,
however, depended completely on cases which
applied only the federal constitution. Despite that
court's claim to have disposed of the State law issues,
those questions are yet to be decided.
When a Court of Appeals is presented with both
state and federal bases for a proposition of
constitutional law and fails to address the state law
aspects of the question, this Court's procedure is to
review the correctness of the Court of Appeal's
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application of federal and then remand, if necessary,
for a determination of the state law issues.
McCambridge v. State, 712 S.W.2d 499, 501-02 n. 9
(Tex.Cr.App.1986). We will not, therefore, address
article I, sec 8 of the Texas Constitution in this
opinion. (755 S.W.2d 92, 94)
Having thus limited their realm of consideration, the Criminal
Court of Appeals responded only to the question of the
constitutionality of the statute with regard to the United
States Constitution.
In analyzing the question of symbolic speech, the
Criminal Court of Appeals followed the same two-part
procedure employed by the Court of Appeals; which is, first,
to determine whether the action is protected speech and,
second, to determine if the State's interests are great enough to
infringe on the person's rights to free speech. The Criminal
Court of Appeals found no reason to disagree with the Court
of Appeals with regard to the first step of the procedure: they
held that Johnson's action was indeed free speech and entitled
to First Amendment protection (755 S.W.2d 92, 95). Having
once again narrowed its area of focus, the court then turned its
attention to the question of whether or not the State had
sufficient interest to encroach on Johnson's First Amendment
rights.
The first purported interest of the state was to prevent
breaches of the peace. According to Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire "a state may prevent breaches in the peace by
limiting speech" (755 S.W.2d 92, 95). The State held that flag
burnings would fall under this heading because they are
inherently inflammatory. However, "legitimacy of the State
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interest" alone is not enough to justify the "regulation of
protected speech" and bring it into harmony with the First
Amendment (755 S.W.2d 92, 95). The court has shown time
and again that restrictions on speech need to be
conscientiously suited to meet only the legitimate interests of
the state (755 S.W.2d 92, 95). The adoption of the Texas
statute, which limited the criminalization of the desecrating of
a state or national flag to incidents where it may cause "serious
offense," is a "proper step toward narrowly tailoring the
statute to the State's interest" (755 S.W.2d 92, 95). However,
the Criminal Court of Appeals pointed out that a "serious
offense" is not necessarily followed by a breach of the peace
and that one cannot equate the two. It cited as support the
fact that there were many present to view Johnson's act that
were doubtless "seriously offended" and yet no violence
occurred as a result of the flag burning (755 S.W.2d 92, 96).
Johnson's contention with this point of the statute was that it
was too restrictive or overbroad.
The court also pointed out that the existence of a statute
which serves the same basic interest in a less restrictive
manner is evidence that the statue is overbroad (755 S.W.2d
92, 96). It then supplied an example of a statute which served
the State's interest to prevent breaches of the peace in a less
restrictive manner. Texas Penal Code 42.01 states:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally
or knowingly:
(1) uses abusive, indecent, profane, or vulgar
language in a public place, and the language by its
very utterance tends to incite an immediate breach of
the peace;
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(2) makes an offensive gesture or display in a public
place, and the gesture or display tends to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. .. (755 S.W.2d 92, 96)
The very existence of this statute is evidence that the Texas
legislature is capable of offering an alternate wording of §
42.09 to make it less restrictive and more narrowly tailored to
the legitimate interests of the state. Therefore, according to
the court, this proves Johnson's claim that the statute is
overbroad (755 S.W.2d 92, 96).
The second alleged interest of the state was their concern
with maintaining the flag as a symbol of national unity. The
court answered this question by comparing it to Board of
Education v. Barnette, which found that a law requiring
children to salute the flag and simultaneously repeat the Pledge
of Allegiance was unconstitutional. Barnette held that for a
state interest to be sufficient to restrict activity protected
under the First Amendment, it must be requisite to thwart
"grave and immediate danger" to that interest (755 S.W.2d 92,
96-7). Although the interests of the two cases are decidedly
different, the goals of those interests are comparable. They
both seek to preserve and promote national unity (755 S.W.2d
92, 97). The court then quotes a lengthy excerpt from the
Court's opinion written by Justice Jackson. It can be
summarized, using his own words, as follows: "If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein"
(755 S.W.2d 92, 97). The court then reasoned, recognizing
that the right to differ is at the heart of our First Amendment
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liberties, that if the government cannot prescribe a feeling of
unity for its citizens by authoritative sanctions, then it
certainly cannot "carve out a symbol of unity and prescribe
set of approved messages to be associated with that symbol"
(755 S.W.2d 92, 97). In addition, "if a State has a legitimate
interest in promoting a State approved symbol of unity, that
interest is not so compelling as to essentially licence the flag's
use for only the promotion of governmental status quo" (755
S.W.2d 92, 97). The court felt that the brief put forward by
the state did not compellingly show that the flag was in "grave
and immediate danger" of losing its power to inspire feelings
of unity and nationalism (755 S.W.2d 92, 97). Therefore, the
state failed to show "that section 42.09(a)(3) is 'essential' to
prevent" the flag from being reduced to a "meaningless piece
of cloth" (755 S.W.2d 92, 97). Since the court believed that no
grave and immediate danger to the flag as a symbol of national
unity was present, they ruled that section 42.09(a)(3) cannot be
used to punish acts of flag desecration that fall under the
protection of free speech. Yet, they refused to give their view
on whether or not flag desecration that is not considered
protected speech can be punished by the state. The court felt
that no other explanation or considerations were necessary,
and they reversed and remanded the prior courts' decisions
(755 S.W.2d 92, 97).
At this point, the state appealed the case to the United
States Supreme Court and certiorari was granted. The case
was argued before the court by Kathi Alyce Drew of Dallas,
Texas for the State and William M. Kunstler of New York for
Johnson on March 21, 1989 (109 S.Ct. 2533, 36). The Supreme
court held that Johnson's conviction for flag desecration was
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not consistent with the First Amendment, and handed down
its decision on June 21, 1989 {109 S.Ct. 2533, 35). In that
decision, the Supreme Court held that:
(1) defendant's act of burning American flag during
protest rally was expressive conduct within
protection of First Amendment, and (2) State could
not justify prosecution of defendant based on
interest in preventing breaches of peace or to
preserve flag as symbol of nationhood and national
unity. (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2534)
With regard to Point One, the Supreme court's decision was
in consonance with all the prior courts' findings and thus need
not be addressed any further. Concerning Point Two, the
Supreme Court's opinion was also in agreement with the
Texas Criminal Appeal's decision. However, the court further
pointed out that the attempted restrictions of the State upon
Johnson's First Amendment rights were "content based," and
thus made it impossible to apply the O'Brien test "whereby an
important governmental interest in regulating nonspeech can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms
when speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the
same course of conduct" {109 S.Ct. 2533, 2536). The interest
of the State to prevent breaches of the peace was disabled by
the Supreme Court as follows:
Expression may not be prohibited on the basis that
an audience that takes serious offense to the
expression may disturb the peace, since the
government cannot assume that every expression of
a provocative idea will incite a riot but must look to
the actual circumstances surrounding the expression.
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Johnson's expression of dissatisfaction with the
Federal Government's policies also does not fall
within the class of "fighting words" likely to be seen
as a direct personal insult or an invitation to
exchange fisticuffs. This Court's holding does not
forbid a State to prevent "imminent lawless action"
and, in fact, Texas has a law specifically prohibiting
breaches of the peace. (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2536)
The Court thus ruled that the state's first interest was content
based, and lacked the power to infringe upon Johnson's rights
to free speech.
With regard to the State's second interest, the court ruled
that it, too, was content based and did "not justify Johnson's
conviction" (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2536). This decision was based on
the fact that the Texas statute was only concerned with
protecting the flag when its "intentional and knowing"
desecration "causes serious offense to others" (109 S.Ct. 2533,
2536). The court affirmed that the government cannot forbid
the expression of ideas "merely because society finds the
idea[s] offensive or disagreeable, even where our flag is
involved" (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2536). The Court concluded its
decision by stating that "this Court will not create an
exception to these principles protected by the First
Amendment for the American flag alone" (109 S.Ct. 2533,
2536). Thus, the State's interest to preserve the flag as a
symbol of nationhood and national unity was overpowered by
the Court.
The Supreme Court narrowly ruled in Johnson's favor;
the final vote was five in favor of Johnson and four against
him. Justice Brennan "delivered the opinion of the Court in

which Marshall, Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined"
(109 S.Ct. 2533, 2536). "Kennedy, J., [also] filed a concurring
opinion" (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2536). The dissenting Justices were
Rehnquist, C.J., White, O'Connor, JJ., and Stevens J. (109
S.Ct. 2533, 2536). Both Stevens, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., filed
dissenting opinions with White and O'Connor, J., joining in
the latter (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2536). Due to the discord among
the Justices, a careful comparison of their respective opinions
is fruitful in understanding the issues which ultimately
determined the outcome of the case.
First, we turn our attention to the opinion of the Court
offered by Justice Brennan. At this point we shall only
examine only a few elements of the respective opinions that
directly oppose one another. According to Justice Brennan,
the government cannot criminally enforce the "proper
treatment of the flag," but rather its duty is to persuade others
"who feel differently about these matters ... that they are
wrong" (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2547-48). He proposes an alternate
solution for the prevention of flag burning by saying:
We can imagine no more appropriate response to
burning a flag than waving one's own, no better way
to counter a flag burner's message than by saluting
the flag that burns, no surer means of preserving the
dignity even of the flag burned than by-as one
witness here did-according its remains a respectful
burial. We do not consecrate the flag by punishing
its desecration, for in so doing we dilute the freedom
that this cherished emblem represents. (109 S.Ct.
2533, 2548)

In view of this statement, it is no surprise that the Court
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believed its decision would serve to strengthen the position of
the flag by reconfirming its position as an ensign of "freedom
and inclusiveness" (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2547). Thus, Justice
Brennan explained some of the Court's reasons for protecting
behavior like Johnson's.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy corroborated
Justice Brennan's opinion. But he further pointed out that it
was a decision that the Court did not necessarily enjoy giving;
in fact, he said that the decision was quite painful. Yet, he
declared that decisions like this one are made "because they are
right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as
we see them, compel the result" (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2548).
Kennedy, in alluding to the dissenting opinions, stated that,
"The case here today forces the recognition of the costs to
which [the] beliefs [of law, peace, and freedom] commit us"
(109 S.Ct. 2533, 2549). He further urged that, "It is poignant
but fundamental that the flag protects those who hold it in
contempt" (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2549). Therefore, the overriding
view of these two principles is that the flag protects all under
its majestic standard, even before it preserves itself.
The dissenting views of the Court offered pleas less based
in reason than the assenting opinions. They, in fact, seemed
to follow Justice Kennedy's admonition to "exploit the
uniquely persuasive power of the flag" in order to persuade
others to their point of view (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2548). The first
dissenting opinion of the Court was offered by Justice
Rehnquist with Justices White and O'Connor joining. The
beginning of that opinion gives a historical account of the flag
apparently intending to show its self-evident value as an
unrivaled symbol of our nation (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2549-51).
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Given in defense of this technique is the "familiar aphorism"
of Justice Holmes which states, "a page of history is worth a
volume of logic" (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2549). For the most part,
Rehnquist presents war stories designed to demonstrate the
flag's ability to rally and motivate the people. He even
includes a piece of poetry by John Greenleaf Whittier,
questionably presented as historical when at best it is
"unadulterated fiction" (Massey 1048-49). Rehnquist
concludes his brief history with the following:
The American flag, then, throughout more than 200
hundred years of our history, has come to be the
visible symbol embodying our Nation. It does not
represent any particular political party, and it does
not represent any particular political philosophy.
The flag is not simply another "idea" or "point of
view" competing for recognition in the marketplace
of ideas. Millions and millions of Americans regard
it with an almost mystical reverence regardless of
what sort of social, political, or philosophical beliefs
they may have. I cannot agree that the First
Amendment invalidates the Act of Congress, and the
laws of 48 of the 50 States, which make criminal the
public burning of the flag. (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2552)
Rehnquist obviously sides with the Texas Court of
Appeals, which holds flag burning as so inherently
inflammatory as to incite a breach of the public peace (109
S.Ct. 2533, 2554). His view suggests that he would rather
protect the symbol over the individuals of the nation that the
symbol represents. This is fundamentally opposed to the
Court's final decision.
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Rehnquist with Justices White and O'Connor joining. The
beginning of that opinion gives a historical account of the flag
apparently intending to show its self-evident value as an
unrivaled symbol of our nation (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2549-51).
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Rehnquist then presents a potentially compelling
similarity between the flag and the Lincoln Memorial. He
wisely points out that anyone caught defacing or damaging the
Lincoln Memorial would be punished without hesitation or
controversy (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2555). He states that the flag is
comparable to the Lincoln Memorial in that is it a national
resource, and that the government has just as much interest
preserving the Lincoln Memorial as it does in protecting the
United States flag (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2555). Here Rehnquist's
reasoning is subject to the criticism that the Lincoln Memorial
is a rare resource, not easily duplicated, and it is owned by the
government, not an individual. The flag, on the other hand,
can and is be reproduced readily and it can be purchased by
individual members of the community. One may wonder if
the outcome of the case would have been different if Johnson
had burned a flag taken from a government-owned monument
or flagpole, or even if he had burned an extremely rare
American flag?
Justice Stevens supports Justice Rehnquist's opinion with
one of his own. He uses an analogy similar to Rehnquist's,
comparing the flag to the Washington Monument. Of this he
says, "The creation of a federal right to post bulletin boards
and graffiti on the Washington Monument might enlarge the
market for free expression, but at a cost I would not pay" (109
S.Ct. 2533, 2557). Here Justice Stevens' argument debatable in
the same way as Justice Rehnquist's argument was.
It is probable that this form of argumentation, although
justifiably filled with patriotic sentiment, is not as persuasive
as the majority opinions offered by the Court. Perhaps it was
for these reasons that the Court "in prior cases dealing with

flag desecration statutes have left open the question that the
Court resolves today" (109 S.Ct. 2533, 2554). In such an
emotionally and spirited conflict as this, the dangers of not
arriving at the most reasonable decision are great. The
Court's decision comes with the reassuring clarity that the
Court decided the outcome despite their emotions, and their
reasoning is adequately compelling. Through the decision of
Texas v. johnson the Court finally ruled unilaterally that "the
imposition of criminal penalties on... protestors [for flag
burning] impermissibly infringed upon their rights to free
expression," thus establishing a standard for all future flag
burning cases (Dyroff 1023).
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Bigots Beware:
Wisconsin v. Mitchell and the
Legalization of Penalty Enhancement
Alisha Prinvale
Intolerance is alive and well in America. This is
manifested in the prevalence of "hate crimes." Hate crimes are
those crimes committed to person or property specifically due
to the person or owner's race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin, or ancestry. With the growth of
hate crimes, many states have instituted hate crime legislation.
In Wisconsin, this legislation comes in the form of penalty
enhancement. According to Wisconsin law, sec. 939.645,
Stats., a perpetrator may receive an extended sentence if it can
be proven that the perpetrator intentionally selected the
victim because of the victim's race, religion, color, disability,
sexual orientation, national origin, or ancestry (508 U.S. 481).
A particular perpetrator, Todd Mitchell, challenged the
constitutionality of this statute. The Supreme Court
ultimately decided against Mitchell and thus gave States the
permission to draft hate crime legislation.
On the evening of October 7, 1989, nineteen-year-old
Todd Mitchell was among approximately ten black young
men discussing the film Mississippi Burning outside an
apartment complex. Mitchell began instigating the crowd by
asking, "Do you all feel hyped up to move on some white
people?" Fourteen-year-old Gregory Reddick appeared

